We develop a fundamental model for spot electricity prices, based on stochastic processes for underlying factors (fuel prices, power demand and generation capacity availability), as well as a parametric form for the bid stack function which maps these price drivers to the power price. Using observed bid data, we find high correlations between the movements of bids and the corresponding fuel prices. We fit the model to the PJM and New England markets in the US, and discuss its performance, in terms of capturing key properties of simulated price trajectories, as well as comparing implied forward prices with observed data.
Introduction
The quest to model the unusual behaviour of electricity prices often leads to a choice between realistic, but complicated, models and simpler reduced-form models with convenient pricing formulas. In particular, due to the non-storability of electricity, there is a closer link between power and its fundamental underlying price drivers (in particular fuel prices, load and generating capacity) than in other markets. We propose a supply and demand based hybrid model, which exploits these links with underlying factors and allows flexibility and realism, while still retaining tractability for derivative pricing purposes.
Electricity spot prices typically exhibit periodicity (at annual, weekly and daily horizons), meanreversion, very high volatility and sudden price spikes, all of which can be traced to supply and demand related causes. (see eg Burger et al (2007) and Eydeland and Wolyniec (2003) ) Forward prices show none of this volatile behaviour, but instead suggest the need for multi-factor models to capture the movements of different parts of the forward curve; this is illustrated by the Principal Component Analysis of Koekebakker and Ollmar (2005) and by discussions of volatility term structure by Clewlow and Strickland (2000) . Furthermore, both forwards and longer-term spot dynamics reveal close links with underlying drivers such as demand (or weather patterns) and especially fuel prices. Burger et al (2007) and Emery and Liu (2002) discuss the apparent cointegration, rather than the simple correlation of power and fuel prices, as long-term levels move together. All of these characteristics suggest the importance of looking beyond historic price series to better understand the dynamics of power prices in relation to fundamental drivers.
Nonetheless, the desire for analytic formulas and efficient pricing techniques has led to a large literature on direct spot or forward price modelling. Early spot price models by Lucia and Schwartz (2002) , and Schwartz and Smith (2000) proposed a two-factor diffusion model to capture the different short and long-term dynamics of power prices. However, the importance of electricity spikes has led to the use of jump-diffusion processes by many authors, including Cartea and Figueroa (2005) , and Kluge (2006) . An affine jump diffusion framework leads to convenient formulas for derivative prices; see, for example Deng (1999) , and Culot et al (2006) , who also suggest regime-switching jumps to capture the behaviour of short-lived price spikes. Pure regime switching models have also been studied by De Jong and Huisman (2005) and Weron et al (2004) , while an alternative approach is proposed by Geman and Roncoroni (2006) , forcing jumps to be downwards when prices are above a certain threshold. While many of these models produce useful results and realistic price dynamics, they often face calibration challenges due either to unobservable factors, choices of probability measure, or to the complication of identifying historical spikes. In addition, they fail to capture the important correlations between power prices and other energy prices.
The alternative category of structural, fundamental, or supply and demand based models consists of a wide range of work including agent-based models of market power and bidding strategy (e.g. Ruibal and Mazumdar (2008) , Supatgiat et al (2001) ), production cost based equilibrium models (eg Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) ) and high-frequency analyses of the dominant spot price drivers (eg Karakatsani and Bunn (2008) ). Many authors have studied the impact on power prices of movements in physical variables such as temperature, rainfall patterns and other demand-side factors (eg Huisman (2008) , Vevhilainen and Pyykkonen (2004) ), while some have focused primarily on specifying the correct shape of the electricity supply function (e.g. Kanamura and Ohashi (2004) ). These models all attempt to bridge the gap between pure power price models and the complex equilibrium models used in industry to forecast prices based on detailed market knowledge such as specific generators' costs, schedules and constraints. Amongst the class of stochastic, econometric style models most useful for derivative pricing, Eydeland and Wolyniec (2003) discuss the role of hybrid models, though they still rely on fairly detailed local market knowledge and large simulations. At the other end of the spectrum, Barlow (2002) proposes a simple non-linear Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model consisting of a mean-reverting demand process combined with a supply curve. A similar approach is taken by Skantze et al (2000) , Eydeland and Geman (1999) , Villaplana (2004) , and Cartea and Villaplana (2007) , with the inclusion of capacity as a stochastic process, incorporated through an exponentiallyshaped supply curve. Burger et al (2004) consider a non-parametric supply curve, fitted using cubic splines, and assumed to be a function of demand over capacity. A slightly different perspective is gained by considering reserve margin (extra capacity available beyond demand) to be a key driver, particularly as a low level of margin corresponds to a period of market strain, and consequently a higher chance of a sudden price spike. This idea is exploited in a regime-switching framework by Mount et al (2006) and Anderson and Davison (2008) , a non-parametric approach by Boogert and Dupont (2008) and a model which incorporates forward-looking margin information by Cartea et al (2008) .
While the appropriate choice of factors may vary across different markets, the articles above focus mainly on load (demand) and capacity fluctuations, which are known to be the main short-term drivers of power prices. Moving to medium or long term dynamics, data suggests that it is very important to incorporate fuel price risks into the modelling framework. Pirrong and Jermakyan (2005,2005) propose a fairly simple and intuitive model based on the two risk factors of demand and natural gas price. As in our work, they study the PJM market and advocate the use of historical generator bid data to estimate the transformation from underlying factors to power prices, suggesting a simple non-parametric approximation to the bid curve, derived from the bid curve on the same date of a previous year and adjusting by the ratio of gas prices (or forward gas prices) on the two dates. We propose a more realistic, parametric approach to the bid stack function, allowing for the overlap of bids from generators of different fuel types. Thus, our model extends their approach by allowing multiple fuel prices as factors, as well as addressing capacity or margin issues such as outages. This allows us to capture the rather complex dependence structure of power and fuel prices, as needed to price a variety of cross-commodity spread options and other derivatives.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the two North East US markets used in our analysis. Section 3 presents our approach to modelling the bid stack function, which links electricity spot prices to underlying drivers. We specify slightly different models for PJM and NEPOOL and demonstrate the strong fit to historical bid data. Section 4 completes our modelling framework by proposing stochastic processes for each of the underlying risk factors: fuel prices, demand or load, and available capacity or margin. Section 5 assesses the performance of the model through analysis of both simulated price paths and forward prices, in comparison to observed data. Section 6 concludes.
Electricity Market Data Set
We shall focus on two US electricity markets: the PJM market (Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, plus parts of nine other Eastern states) and the NEPOOL market (the New England region). While our methodology can be adapted to fit many different local characteristics, we choose these two US markets primarily for the availability of historical bid data (at a six-month lag), as well as other useful historical information also published on the PJM and NEPOOL websites. 1 The availability of bid data in a convenient form is still uncommon in power markets and is certainly central to the methodology described here, but it is possible to imagine approximations or variations of the model with parameters estimated for example from cost or heat rate data.
PJM is a large market currently serving over 50 million people, with a total capacity which grew from 50,000 MW to 160,000 MW between June 2000 and July 2007. This time period forms our dataset for parameter estimation, and we use PJM West price data throughout. 2 The PJM market has an interesting mix of fuel types (power sources), with a significant proportion of capacity coming from coal, gas and oil, and nuclear. Table 1 illustrates how this fuel type breakdown has changed slightly from year to year over the period considered. In contrast to PJM, New England has a much smaller and younger market with capacity fairly stable around 30,000 MW throughout the dataset, which covers the time period March 2003 to August 2007. NEPOOL has a simpler fuel mix than PJM, having little coal-powered generation. Furthermore, gas and oil together represent nearly half of the capacity in the market, while the remainder is primarily nuclear and hydro. Most nuclear and some hydro generators typically make bids of zero as they have little flexibility in terms of switching on or off in response to demand. As we shall see in Section 3, NEPOOL can therefore be treated in a simplified framework as a one-fuel market, whereas PJM requires at least two fuel types to capture the dynamics realistically. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the real-time daily average peak price (average of hours 8-23, weekdays only) for PJM. The dynamics for NEPOOL are slightly less volatile but generally similar in appearance. Both real-time (RT) and day-ahead (DA) prices exist for both markets, with real-time prices typically more volatile. We shall only consider peak prices, as the modelling methodology is contracts traded on NYMEX.
3 PJM data has been taken from annual generating capacity reports (http://www.pjm.com/services/systemperformance/operations-analysis.html) while NEPOOL data from Eydeland and Wolyniec (2003) . Note that gas generators that also have oil-based generation capability are listed separately. So if all of these choose to use gas, the proportion of gas generators in the market is approximately 26% and 32% for PJM and NEPOOL respectively. less well suited to describing off-peak prices, and thus a daily price will refer to a daily peak average. Although daily price series clearly reveal occasional price spikes, the magnitude and frequency of spikes is much higher at an hourly level (i.e., before averaging), as a result of brief outages or transmission constraints. The price series show high correlations with natural gas prices, also as illustrated in Figure 1 . Here we have removed the noise by considering only monthly average prices, and obtain a remarkable visual correlation with monthly average Henry Hub gas prices. This link between gas and power prices is extremely strong for the gas and oil-dominated New England market, but also remarkably strong for PJM, as the market clearing price in peak hours is often set by the bids from gas generators. Capturing this relationship accurately is one of the primary advantages of our modelling approach. In Section 3, we introduce our model for the bid stack, which can be understood as the map from the underlying random factors to the spot electricity price, and is thus the key component of the power price model. We use daily bid data, consisting of day-ahead bids from all available generators (close to 1000 for PJM, close to 300 for NEPOOL), for calibration. 4 These bids describe the prices at which the generator is willing to sell varying amounts of electricity. Thus each generator submits a non-decreasing step function with a maximum of 10 steps, or price and quantity pairs. For example, a generating unit which bids (200MW, $40), (300MW, $50), and (350MW, $80) is willing to sell its first 200MW of power at $40, its next 100MW at $50, and its final 50MW at $80.
5 By stacking all bids from all generators in order from lowest to highest price, we can create the market bid stack, typical examples of which are provided in Figure 2 . The market administrator then determines the hourly spot price by matching with the total demand for power. Note that some generators submit 'must-run' bids, which we treat as bids of $0, as they mean that the generator must sell its power no matter what the price is. 6 As peak prices typically stay above $30 but below $150 (for over 90% of the hours observed during the most recent three years) the middle section of the bid stack is most relevant in determining prices, though the right hand side becomes important in the event of spikes. Figure  2 also shows that significant movement can occur from month to month, especially during times of large gas price increases, as was the case in both February 2003 and August 2005. We observe that 4 Note that only daily observations of the bid stack are available for PJM, whereas hourly stacks are available for NEPOOL, though intra-day variation is low. We create an average bid stack for each day before performing the maximum likelihood estimation. Generator-specific issues such as start-up times and maximum run times per day are ignored for simplicity. Details of the name of or type of generator making each bid are not revealed. 5 In PJM, generators have the alternative of connecting these bid points linearly instead of using a step function. 6 In fact, this requirement of some generators can very occasionally produce negative prices in electricity markets, but this is only realistic during off-peak hours, which we do not model here.
during these months the majority of NEPOOL's bid stack shifted upwards, while only the right hand half of PJM's was affected.
Clearly power generators adjust their bids according to changes in their generation costs. We therefore expect a strong correlation between bid stack movements and fuel price changes, though the possible impact of other factors such as the exercise of market power or strategic bidding should be acknowledged. In order to understand this relationship, it is useful to consider the bid stack as a histogram of bids, as shown in Figure 3 . We simply add up the total amount of capacity in MW that has been bid within each price bin. 7 This provides an alternative perspective on the same data shown in Figure 2 , and interestingly reveals one main cluster of bids for NEPOOL, but a pair of clusters for PJM separated by a region of few bids. We expect bids to be ordered roughly by fuel type corresponding to the merit order for each market (Table 1 ). This suggests that most bids in the left cluster of PJM's histogram correspond to nuclear or coal generators, while the right cluster is primarily gas and oil, although low gas prices in particular can cause these clusters to merge somewhat. While this clustering provides our primary motivation for studying the bid stack, it is also important to discuss the far left and far right of the stack. The far left is less important as it consists of zero bids (including 'must-run') or very low bids, both corresponding primarily to nuclear power generators. This first 20-30% of capacity almost never determines the market clearing price during peak hours. On the other hand, the far right of the stack typically consists of a scattering of bids between about $250 and $1000 and therefore sets the price only during times of strain on the market. As we have seen, these instances occur fairly frequently during peak hours, as they correspond to the distinctive spikes visible in power prices. Our approach to modelling the entire bid stack focuses on the movement of these clusters of bids as fuel prices change. 
The Bid Stack Model
Let S t represent the spot price at time t, and D t ∈ [0, 1] the demand at time t, assumed to be inelastic with respect to price, as is often the case for electricity. We model demand not in terms of megawatt-hours but rather as a proportion of total market capacity, simplifying notation and allowing for growth in the market size. For generator i of n, let x i be quantity supplied (again, normalised by total capacity) and b
t (x i ) be the bid curve at time t, where b
Generator i's maximum capacity is c max i
, total market capacity is c max = i c max i
, and p max is the maximum bid allowed in the market (e.g. $1000 for PJM). Then the market clearing price which allows supply and demand to match is given by
Combining bid curves from different generators intuitively means stacking their component bids in order from lowest to highest. If we assume that all bid curves are strictly increasing (and step functions can be approximated by strictly increasing functions), then this corresponds to inverting each bid curve, adding the inverses, and inverting the sum. Letting B obs t (·) denote the exact bid stack observed in the market at time t, we can write
These equations provide a simplified description of an electricity market's structure, but rarely hold in practice. This is due to a variety of complications including generator outages, transmission constraints, imports or exports, variations in geographical distribution of demand, possible demand elasticity, and other rebalancing effects, especially for real-time prices. In order to capture these effects yet retain tractability, we introduce a process C t for capacity available at time t (again normalised with c max ), and assume that now the bid stack is a function of D t /C t . In other words, any loss of supply is assumed to be equally spread throughout the stack, an approach also taken by Burger et al (2004) . A fundamental requirement of this framework is that demand never exceeds capacity, so 0 < D t /C t < 1. Typically we also observe 0 < D t < C t < 1, though sometimes C t > 1 (for example through imports of capacity). The spot price is now given by
where the time dependence of the function B t (·) is in fact a dependence on fuel prices, as these are the primary drivers of generators' bids. While this basic framework is only an approximation to the complexities of electricity markets, it allows us to retain the direct link to supply and demand factors, the flexibility to adapt to different markets, and the ability to price derivative products fairly easily.
We now introduce our model for this function B t (·), which we estimate directly from available bid data for PJM and NEPOOL.
General Case -fitting distributions to bids
As illustrated in Figure 3 , a histogram of bids provides a useful alternative to simply observing the bid stack directly in Figure 2 , and motivates fitting a density function to these histograms. Bids from generators with different fuel types are driven by different costs, leading to a mix of distributions in the overall market, with weights corresponding to the breakdown of fuel types in the market. With this new approach, the spot price S t = B t (x) can be reinterpreted as the x-quantile of our bid distribution. Thus we fit a function to the density of bids and then deduce the quantile function (inverse cumulative distribution function), as opposed to fitting the bid stack (or quantile function) directly. One advantage is the wide range of well-known distributions that we can test. Furthermore, we can link distributions' parameters to the underlying fuel prices in an intuitive manner.
In the most general case, let
be the proportion of bids below $x for generators of fuel type i = 1, . . . , N , with weights w i , . . . , w N , summing to unity. Then the spot power price S t solves
and the bid stack is simply the inverse of the cdf, F (x), of the mixture distribution.
To improve the fit in the most relevant region of the bid stack, we may wish to truncate the domain of D t /C t from (0, 1) to (b L , b U ) and ignore the tails of the bid distribution. This is only appropriate if P [b L < D t /C t < b U ] = 1 (typically set b L = 0.2 or 0.3 and b U = 0.9 or 0.95). We then have
poses problems from a modelling perspective. Therefore, we suggest an alternative approach of simply linearly rescaling both D t and D t /C t such that for new variablesD t andC t , we requireD t /C t ∈ (0, 1), just as in the untruncated case. In practice this means that the lowest portion of both demand and capacity is fixed, and changes in both demand and capacity only occur beyond this point in the stack. Moreover, any drop in available capacity is now assumed to affect only the region (b L , b U ) of the bid stack. We then have
(2) Note thatC t = C t , asC t represents the percentage availability of capacity in the relevant region of the stack, not in the market in total.
We fit distributions to the bid data by maximum likelihood estimation, where a bid of q megawatts at price p is treated as q separate observations of a bid at p. Let (p j , q j ), j = 1, . . . M represent all the price quantity pairs that make up the portion
times the total capacity of the market. Consider the general case of fitting a mix of N distributions, with weights w i (where w 1 + . . . + w N = 1), and two-parameter density functions f i (x; α i , β i ), for i = 1, . . . , N . Then the log-likelihood function (for a given day) is
We have compared results using the following distributions: Gaussian, logistic, Cauchy, and Weibull. These all have appropriate humped shapes and only two parameters, one corresponding at least roughly to the mean, and the other roughly to the standard deviation or shape. Hence we use the notation m i , s i , i = 1 . . . N for these parameters. The performance of the four distributions is fairly similar in terms of both likelihood and capturing fuel price correlations, though thicker-tailed distributions dominate for higher choices of the cutoff point b U , where the thin-tailed Gaussian performs erratically. Ultimately, we advocate the logistic distribution (with mean m i and scale parameter s i equal to √ 3/π standard deviations) as the best choice, since it performs consistently for both markets and leads to the simplest mathematical expressions. For a mix of N logistic distributions, the log-likelihood function is given by
One Fuel Case (N = 1) -NEPOOL
Beginning with the simpler NEPOOL case, the bids of generators can be split into bids of zero (roughly 30%) by nuclear and some hydro producers, and a cluster of bids primarily from oil and gas generators. Removing the lowest bids and considering the close relationship between gas and oil prices, a single fuel model is reasonable. We therefore estimate the bid stack parameters for each historical date as follows. Firstly, we ignore bids of below $10 and also the highest 5%, 10% or 15% of
9 Then (for the logistic distribution), we maximise with respect to m 1 and s 1 the likelihood function (3) with N = 1. We use a standard numerical optimisation scheme in MATLAB, while noting that closed form expressions exist form 1 andŝ 1 only in the Gaussian case. Figure 4 illustrates the MLE results form 1 andŝ 1 with b U = 0.9, also showing Henry Hub natural gas prices over the corresponding time period. Apart from two surprising spikes in bid levels in January 2004 and 2005, the correlation with gas prices is very high, and as much as 95% in the more recent data. 10 The two spikes could perhaps have been caused by strategic bidding, though no particular information has been found to explain these events.
11 Nonetheless, the results strongly suggest assuming a linear dependence structure between m 1 and s 1 and the natural gas price G t : Estimating the parameters {α 0 , α 1 , β 0 , β 1 } by regression produces slightly different results depending on the choice of distribution, upper cutoff of bids, b U , and time period considered. The upper section of Table 2 shows the results for b U = 0.9, which appears to be a reasonable choice, reducing the influence of the far right tail of the bid stack while keeping enough of the relevant region. 12 The results are very encouraging, showing high values of R 2 , particularly form 2 , and particularly over recent years, avoiding the two spikes described above.
While all four distributions studied share the useful property of having a fairly simple explicit inverse cumulative distribution function, this is particularly true for the logistic case. As a result, the one-fuel model for NEPOOL leads to a convenient equation for the bid stack, and hence the spot electricity price. Under the assumptions introduced above, (2) can be written as follows:
Thus we obtain a spot electricity price S t which is linear in the natural gas price G t , similar to the model for PJM prices by Pirrong and Jermakyan (2005) . However, this only occurs in the one-fuel case in our model, so for NEPOOL, but not PJM. Note that the fairly simple form of (4) is very appealing, particularly for the pricing of forwards presented in Section 4.
Two Fuel Case (N = 2) -PJM
As discussed briefly in Section 2 and illustrated in Figure 3 , the variety of fuel types in the PJM market suggests the use of at least two distributions to capture the behaviour of the bid stack. We choose a pair of distributions to roughly represent the coal and gas portions of the market, and estimate the bid stack parameters for each historical date as follows.
.95], such that we ignore the highest 5, 10 or 15% and lowest 20% of bids for each date. The low bids in particular correspond primarily to the nuclear generators and hence do not move in the same manner as the neighbouring coal bids. 13 Next, calculate fixed weights w 1 and w 2 = 1 − w 1 based on the split of coal versus gas and oil in Table 1 . These weights change only at a few discrete points in time to reflect market changes. Finally (for the logistic distribution), maximise the likelihood function (3) for N = 2 with respect to {m 1 , s 1 , m 2 , s 2 }. ŝ 2 , compared with Henry Hub natural gas prices (right graph). Figure 5 shows the gas distribution's estimated meanm 2 and standard deviationŝ 2 plotted against time in the logistic case with b U = 0.95. As expected, bothm 2 andŝ 2 show a strong correlation with the Henry Hub natural gas price, plotted again in Figure 5 over the corresponding time period. The results are particularly encouraging using the more recent data, with correlation as high as 96%. The results form 1 andŝ 1 are plotted in Figure 6 , along with the changes in Appalachian coal prices over the same period. Though not as striking as the gas correlation, some correlation is visible, particularly with the period of significant increase during the year 2004.
As for New England, these results for PJM suggest a linear dependence structure of the form, 13 Tests reveal that including these lowest bids produces worse results by distorting the trends in coal parametersm 1 andŝ 1 . Tests with more than two distributions also do not appear to improve the results, and in fact tend to reduce the stability of the parametersm i andŝ i over time. where P t and G t are stochastic process for coal and gas prices respectively. Regression can again be used to estimate the parameters {α 0 ,α 1 ,β 0 ,β 1 , α 0 , α 1 , β 0 , β 1 }. Results are shown in the middle and lower sections of Table 2 , and are very positive, particularly for recent years. The R 2 values form 2 are remarkably high, and explain the source of the high correlation observed earlier in the monthly power and gas price series plotted in Figure 1 . As before for NEPOOL, the standard deviation or scale parameter (hereŝ 2 ) shows a weaker relationship with gas prices than the mean, due in part to the method of bid data truncation at b U .
Under the assumptions introduced above, our modelling framework from (2), can be written for PJM in the logistic case as follows:
As this function is not invertible explicitly, we cannot write down the bid stack function, but can easily solve for S t numerically. 
Discussion
The high fuel price correlations observed in both PJM and NEPOOL bids justify the methodology of the bid stack model, both in terms of the use of actual bid data and the representation of the bid stack as an inverse cdf function. Furthermore, the use of Gaussian, logistic, Cauchy or Weibull distributions with parameters linked to fuel prices can be understood intuitively in terms of the mix of different heat rates for different generating units in the market. For example, suppose that for a given fuel, H is a random variable describing the variety of heat rates existing among different generating units due to factors such as age and technology. Suppose also that constant fixed costs A exist for each generator per MWh of power generated. Finally suppose that generators make bids corresponding exactly to their costs. Then the random variable X t = A + HG t describes the bid of a randomly chosen gas generating unit given some gas price
14 Of course, this argument for heat rate distributions would not work so conveniently mathematically using other distributions, but the intuition still holds. Interestingly, the values we observe for α 1 (7.67 and 8.51 for NEPOOL and PJM respectively) also correspond closely to average PJM heat rates for gas generators, listed by PJM as approximately 7.3 MBtu/MWh in 2004 (PJM report (2005)). Similarly,α 1 = 0.408 matches equally well with the coal heat hate of 0.378 t/MWh used by Fehr and Hinz (2006) . This suggests the possible use of heat rate or cost data as an alternative to bid data, though it should be remembered that strategic bidding could also have an influence on the parameters. Interestingly, recent work by Hortacsu and Puller (2007) on strategic bidding suggests that while marginal cost curves often contain prominent flat or vertical sections, optimal bid curves are typically smoothed to more closely resemble the bid stacks above. Thus, even for a market with a very narrow range of heat rates, strategic bidding could result in the fairly wide bid distributions we observe.
The results presented above for both PJM and NEPOOL strongly support the overall framework of the bid stack model to connect electricity, gas and coal prices. However, there are several complications that should be handled carefully when estimating parameter values. Clearly, we need to find a compromise between striving for a perfect fit of the bid stack and a rough approximation which captures the basic relationships. The primary issues are the best choices for b U , b L and w 1 , and the corresponding impact on spot price behaviour. The value of w 1 is calculated from the percentages in Table 1 , and changes at six different dates during the time period, corresponding to times of market expansion. 15 The value of b L is much less significant than b U since the peak power price is much more likely to be set in the far right than far left of the stack. Tests of regressions using different values of b U confirm the choices of 0.9 (NEPOOL) and 0.95 (PJM) as appropriate. Only a few hourly prices are set beyond these points, and Section 4.4 completes our methodology for capturing the far right tail of the price distribution, by compensating for errors produced by truncating the bid data at b U .
Modelling the Price Drivers
The bid stack model is supplemented by stochastic processes for the primary risk factors which drive the spot power prices: gas prices G t (and coal prices P t ), demand (or load) D t , and capacity available C t . An advantage of the supply and demand approach is that while choosing fairly simple processes for the underlying factors, we can still replicate the unusual features of power prices through the 14 Of course the distributions for H and A may change over time for example as technology improves, which suggests that regressions over more recent data might be considered more useful. 15 We make the assume that nuclear is grouped with coal and hydro with natural gas while 'other' is split equally between coal and gas, before removing b L = 0.2 from coal/nuclear and rescaling. This process for w 1 is then tested by comparing with the value of w 1 for each date which minimises the sum of squared errors between the central portion (25%-75%) of the model bid stack and the observed stack. Results lend support the method of choosing w 1 as described.
choice of bid stack function.
Fuel Prices
For both the PJM and NEPOOL markets, the important fuel price to model is the US natural gas price, as discussed earlier and confirmed by the results of the bid stack fit. Coal prices are less important, even for PJM, because they are generally less volatile than gas, they drive a flatter and lower region of the bid stack and they are less significant in setting prices particularly during peak hours. Nevertheless, we propose a simple method for incorporating some coal price information without increasing the complexity of the model. In a more general setting, other fuel prices and even carbon emissions prices can also be included, as is clearly necessary for European power markets today.
Gas Prices
We choose a standard approach to modelling gas prices, by fitting log gas prices with the Schwartz 2-factor model described by Schwartz (1997) , 16 capturing the mean-reversion which is widely believed to exist in most commodity prices, as well as changes to the long term equilibrium level of prices. Let X 1 t and X 2 t be the two independent stochastic factors driving the spot gas price G t , and h(t) be a seasonal component. Dynamics under the risk-neutral measure Q are given by
Gas forward prices F G (t, T ) for delivery at a discrete point in time T have value at time t given by E Q t [G T ], the conditional expectation of G T under Q. Hence we have:
As X 1 t and X 2 t are unobservable factors, we use the Kalman Filter to calibrate our model to available Henry Hub gas data (see eg Schwartz (1997) , Lucia and Schwartz (2002) and Culot et al (2006) in the electricity literature). The transition equation is easily written in vector form using the SDEs in (6). As liquid futures or forward prices are widely available for the US gas market, (7) forms the measurement equation, which importantly is linear in the state variables. NYMEX has provided us with daily historical forward curves from January 2000 through November 2006. We use forward prices for maturities of 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years (and when available 4, 5 and 6 years), thus keeping 6 to 9 forward prices for each historical date and reducing computation time. We also assume that the forwards mature at the middle of each month, though in fact there is a month-long delivery period. The next step is to remove seasonality from the forward curves. Though the shape of the seasonal pattern appears fairly consistently throughout the historical data, the amplitude varies significantly over time for both the forward curve and log-forward curve. Thus, we cannot easily remove the seasonality using the same function h(T ) throughout. Instead, we deseasonalise each forward curve independently as follows. We firstly identify the linear trend in the curve beyond the one-year maturity point, thus avoiding short end deviations. We then let the current month equal the base month, and calculate for every other month the average difference between forwards with maturity in that month and the most recent base month forward. We account for linear trend in the process and average from the one-year point onwards. Finally, we deseasonalise the forward curve by adding or subtracting these average monthly differences as appropriate, relative to the mean of all months.
As is typical for the Kalman Filter, results are very sensitive to the choice of observation noise σ 3 . Hence we perform the optimisation in two stages, similarly to the method of Culot et al (2006) . For fixed σ 3 , we implement the filtering with respect to {κ, µ 1 , σ 1 , µ 2 , σ 2 }, choosing initial parameters X , and the initial value of the conditional covariance matrix of X t to be 0.1I. Thus we find the parameter set that maximises the total likelihood of observing the entire history of forward curves. We then vary σ 3 and rerun the filtering for each new value, in order to minimise the sum of squared errors of all natural gas option prices available on NYMEX. As these are options on forward gas contracts and forwards are lognormally distributed as in (7), option prices (with strike K, option maturity T 1 , forward maturity T 2 , constant interest rate r) are given in closed form by
where Φ is the standard Gaussian cdf, The results are shown in Table 3 for different date ranges. The parameters seem fairly stable over time, though the more recent data is characterised by a slightly higher volatility and faster speed of mean reversion for X 1 and larger negative drift for X 2 . Note that µ 2 < 0 is necessary to account for the fact that the gas forward curve was in backwardation (downward sloping) in 82.5% of the observations in the dataset.
Coal Prices
As PJM is roughly 40% fuelled by coal, changes in coal prices can have a significant effect on the level of power prices. However, as we have seen (e.g. Figure 6 ), coal prices move only gradually, suggesting that volatility is low, and therefore that it is more important to capture the market's expectations of future trends in coal prices, than to capture the stochastic component. Hence we use NYMEX Appalachian coal futures curves, and take the very simple approach of assuming that the coal price at time T in the future will exactly equal the futures price F C (t, T ) with maturity T . Thus we have effectively assumed a deterministic coal price model which is matched to the current forward curve. While this seems artificially simple, it provides satisfactory results in the model without introducing an additional stochastic factor which is likely to have little impact on power prices. 
Demand (Load)
Demand or load is easily observable in all electricity markets, and is typically characterised by multiple periodicities, at annual, weekly and intra-day levels. The lower lines in Figure 7 show average daily peak demand (real-time) in PJM and New England respectively. As we use daily data, we have averaged out intra-day effects and removed weekends and public holidays, so the primary seasonality remaining is annual. Peaks occur in both summer and winter corresponding to higher air conditioning and heating needs, with summer peaks larger than winter peaks, particularly for PJM. Initially we model this deterministic behaviour through a linear trend and a combination of two cosine functions with periods one year and six months. However, data shows that a linear trend is only necessary for the early years of PJM when the market expanded significantly in size. Thus we instead choose the three year period August 2004 to July 2007 and set a 2 = 0 for both markets, as there is no significant trend. Finally, the deseasonalised process is fitted by maximum likelihood estimation using an exponential OU process, as shocks to demand are considered to revert rapidly to the seasonal level. 
where B t is a Brownian Motion independent of W t andW t in the gas process. We assume throughout that fuel prices are independent of demand and capacity, which fluctuate on shorter time scales and are driven by more local conditions; Pirrong and Jermakyan (2005) also suggest this to be a reasonable assumption, though of course a prolonged cold spell over a large region is likely to impact both power demand and gas prices. Table 4 lists the results for both PJM and NEPOOL, and both real-time (RT) and day-ahead (DA) demand, with t = 0 corresponding to June 1st 2000. The results show that mean-reversion rates κ Y and volatility σ Y are higher for NEPOOL than PJM over the chosen period. Although we are interested in hourly spot prices, we fit our demand model only to daily peak average demand as intra-day movements are fairly small and dominated by the intra-day periodicity. This can easily be incorporated into the model, for example with hourly indicator variables, but has very little effect. Intra-day demand movements are ultimately overshadowed by intra-day capacity jumps, as discussed below.
Capacity Available
As explained in Section 3, the process C t (orC t ) captures a variety of supply-side information relating to outages, transmission constraints, exports, imports and other power delivery issues. Therefore it is not easily observable or even intuitively understood, though we can think of it simply as the percentage of maximum capacity available. Since we observe hourly historical prices, demand and bid stacks, we can calculate the implied capacity available C imp t which allows (1) to hold as closely as possible. 17 As B obs (·) is non-decreasing, C The upper lines in Figure 7 show the historical evolution of the daily peak average implied capacity availability C imp t for both PJM and NEPOOL. It has clear seasonality matching roughly with demand seasonality, thus dampening the seasonality of prices. This is due to generators' maintenance schedules which are designed to avoid high demand periods.
19 C imp t thus incorporates both expected and unexpected outages.
Using instead the truncated bid data and rescaledD t andC t involves solving for rescaledC 
Margin
Given our model forD t in (8) above, modellingC t separately makes it difficult to satisfy our fundamental requirement that demand does not exceed capacity. One approach is to modelD t /C t directly, but this prevents us from disentangling demand and supply effects, and from using easily observable and well behaved demand dataD t . Furthermore, it still leaves us the problem of ensuring D t /C t ∈ (0, 1). Instead we propose a stochastic process for the reserve marginM t =C t −D t , representing the amount of extra capacity available in the market but not needed to match demand. By modelling bothD t andM t as strictly positive processes, we automatically fulfil the required condition.
Hence we define (rescaled) implied marginM imp t and (rescaled) model-implied marginM mod t as:
Hourly historical data forM imp t suggests the need for a two-factor model for margin. The movement of daily peak averages over weeks or months shows both mean-reversion and some clear negative correlation with demandD t , as one would expect. Upward shocks to demand often lead to downward shocks to margin, though market mechanisms such as imports, extra capacity reserves and transmission factors can dampen the effect and reduce the correlation. In addition, intra-day hourly margin reveals quite noisy behaviour with sudden and short-lived jumps due to a variety of short-term effects such as outages. We are interested less in describing the precise timing or autocorrelation of these spikes than in describing their magnitude and likelihood. Therefore, we propose a simple regimeswitching model for logM t consisting of an OU process for the 'normal regime' and an independent sample of a shifted exponential random variable for the 'spike regime': log(M t ) = Z OU t with probability 1 − p i Z SP t with probability p i where the normal regime is given by
dB t dB t = ρ dt and the spike regime is given by
Thus, each value of Z SP t (in practice sampled hourly) is independent of previous values, and the probability of being in the spike regime in any future hour is also independent of the current regime.
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Data suggests that the left tail of the hourly margin distribution for PJM is significantly thicker in the summer months, suggesting a higher chance of outages. Therefore we fit seasonal spike parameters p i , λ i : i = 1, 2, 3, 4 where i = 1 corresponds to winter (Dec -Feb), i = 2 to spring (Mar -May), i = 3 to summer (Jun -Aug) and i = 4 to autumn (Sep -Nov).
In order to estimate the parameters above, we firstly use daily average implied marginM imp t , which averages over intra-day spikes, to help better identify the behaviour of Z OU t and especially its correlation withD t . We estimate the parameters {κ Z , µ Z , σ Z , ρ} by maximum likelihood, conditioning on the observed daily value of demandD t . 21 We use the same date range as for the MLE of the demand process. We then move to hourly data to fit the spike regime through a moment matching procedure. In order to estimate the point α beyond which the spike regime should operate, we exploit 20 Tests of historical data using a more formal continuous time Markov Chain with transition matrix lead to an expected duration of stay in the spike regime of approximately 2 hours for PJM and 3 hours for NEPOOL. Thus a more complete regime switching model forM t leads to similar conclusions regarding the rapid speed of recovery from spikes. 21 We capD t /C has a Gaussian distribution and hence a skew of zero. In contrast, the historical distribution of logM imp t has significant negative skew due to the thick left tail caused by outages. We remove as many data points as necessary to obtain a non-negative skew and choose the last point removed to be our parameter estimate for α. Since the remaining historical distribution (with points logM imp t < α removed) is a more accurate representation of the invariant distribution of Z OU t , we re-estimate parameters for µ Z and σ Z to match the first two moments of this distribution. In other words, we equate µ Z to the mean of the truncated distribution, and σ Z to its standard deviation multiplied by √ 2κ Z , withκ Z as before. Essentially, we argue that parameter estimatesκ Z andρ are well fitted by our initial procedure, while the initial estimatorsμ Z andσ Z are distorted by the spikes and require adjustment via moment matching. Therefore,
The final step of the parameter estimation is to find seasonal spike regime parameters p i , and λ i , for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Here we switch from using the left tail of the distributionM imp to that of M mod . This key step allows us to compensate for any errors made in fitting the tail of the bid stack, in particular by not capturing the bids in the region (b U , 1). Though we may retain an artificially steep tail for the bid stack, we correct this by allowing the left tail of the margin distribution to be artificially stretched to produce the observed price spikes. Figure 8 shows log-histograms of logM mod using the logistic distribution (and as usual b U = 0.9 for NEPOOL and b U = 0.95 for PJM). The observed linearity in the left tail justifies the use of an exponential distribution for the outage regime. Clearly for PJM the summer months require a different fit than other seasons, though for NEPOOL the difference between seasons is much less. The parameters p i for each season are estimated simply by finding the proportion of observations belowα, while λ i is estimated as the slope of an ordinary least squares linear fit to the tail of the log-histograms.
22 Table 5 lists all the estimated parameters for the margin process (with RT data for PJM, and DA data for NE), as well as the R 2 values for the linear fits to the tail, which are all above 0.9. Unlike demand, margin appears to be more volatile and 'spikier' for PJM than for NEPOOL, with higher values for κ Z and σ Z , as well as the spike regime probabilities p i . Finally, PJM's values of p 3 = 0.174 and λ 3 = 0.712 confirm that much larger and more frequent spikes occur in the summer, as also noted by Geman and Roncoroni (2006) . 22 Firstly, a slight correction is required for p i , since there exists a positive probability q = Φ "α
belowα occurring in the non-spike regime. Hence, ifp i is the percentage of observations belowα, then p i =p i −q 1−q . Secondly, the regression to find λ i has been performed over the ranges [α − 3,α] and [α − 1.5,α] for PJM and NEPOOL respectively, each split into six equal width probability bins. At this stage it easy to demonstrate the additional convenience of choosing the logistic distribution for our bid stack model in Section 3. Firstly, for the one-fuel case of NEPOOL, our equation for electricity spot prices, (4), can be rewritten as follows:
As S t is linear in logM t , for a given demand and gas price, the exponentially distributed left tail of log-margin (from the spike regime) translates to exponentially distributed price spikes as well. Moreover, for a fixed demand, writing
we can translate the margin spike threshold α into a price spike threshold corresponding to a certain number of standard deviations in the bid distribution for gas. 23 Unlike typical regime-switching models for power prices (eg De Jong and Huisman (2005), Weron et al (2004)), we thus have an exponential 'spike distribution' for power prices which shifts over time as gas prices vary. For example, Figure 1 suggests that while an hourly price of $150 could reasonably be considered a spike in early 2004, it could not be in late 2005 when high gas prices caused daily average peak prices to approach these levels.
While formulas are not as simple in the two-fuel case for PJM, the linear relationship between S t and logM t still holds approximately for the tail, and hence the spike regime. This follows because the influence of the coal distribution is negligible in the far right of the bid stack, so we can think of using a one-fuel model as an approximation. Then
whereM t andD t (andC t below) represent a second rescaling of demand and margin from (b L , b U ) to the gas-dominated portion of the bid stack (
The rescaling technique introduced 23 Ignoring the role of demand in determining price spikes is an approximation, but demand varies much less than margin. As the bid stack is an increasing function ofD
, demand shocks combined with margin shocks will clearly produce higher spikes than margin shocks alone.
in (2) also implies
where the last line holds for small marginM t . Thus, in the right tail of the bid stack, using (10),
The approximate linear relationship between S t and logM t again suggests that, holding gas and demand constant, price spikes caused by margin spikes are also exponentially distributed.
Empirical Results
The performance of the model can be evaluated according to several different criteria for each of the two markets considered. We firstly compare the properties of simulated electricity price paths with those observed in the market, as is suggested by Geman and Roncoroni (2006) . Typical statistics such as mean, variance, skew and kurtosis are considered, but also other key features in power markets, such as correlation with fuel prices and the probability of spikes above certain threshold prices. We make comparisons of price series at various time-scales, since statistics such as correlation are most relevant in terms of daily, weekly or even monthly averages. Though most of our state variables are mean-reverting, the component X Table 5 for January 2000 -November 2006, making use of the most data. Finally, for demand and margin, we use the parameters in Tables 6 and 7, noting that forward prices (taken from NYMEX) are settled using real-time prices for PJM, but day-ahead prices for NEPOOL. Tables 6 and 7 show a comparison of statistics for observed and simulated price data. We include two different observed time periods (Mar 03 to Aug 07 and Mar 05 to Aug 07 for NEPOOL, Jun 00 to Jul 07 and Aug 04 to Jul 07 for PJM) to illustrate the significant variation in all of these parameters over time. In particular, the estimates of skew, kurtosis and the probability of hourly prices greater than $100 are very unstable over time, and other statistics to a lesser extent. As discussed, part of the problem lies in the the non-stationarity of gas prices, while other issues such as growth and development of the market may also play a role. For the simulated statistics, we average over 2000 two-year Monte Carlo simulations of hourly prices with three different starting values for natural gas prices, G 0 = 4.11, 7.19 and 10.04. 24 Note that whileM t andD t are simulated under the real-world measure P, gas prices G t are simulated under the risk-neutral measure Q. Therefore, there is likely to be some difference in simulated statistics and observed statistics due to the market price of natural gas risk. In addition, comparing an average over 2000 gas trajectories with one observed historical trajectory will inevitably lead to significant differences. As a result, we include a further simulation which uses instead a fixed gas price trajectory matching the path of gas prices during the more recent observed period for each market (05-07 for NE, 04-07 for PJM). Overall, the results are satisfactory considering the weaknesses of the approach. In addition to the non-stationarity of gas prices discussed above, statistics such as kurtosis are highly sensitive to very rare but large spikes, implying that a very long historical time series is required to have any confidence in our estimate. However, statistics such as correlation with natural gas prices can be considered more reliable, and for these the model appears to capture the dynamics of the market quite well. In particular, as expected, correlations increase as we move from daily to weekly to monthly averages, since the impact of the shorter-term factors (demand and margin) diminishes. Also, the onefuel model for NEPOOL leads to higher correlations with gas than PJM's two-fuel model. However, the correlation is generally slightly overestimated, perhaps due to the grouping of oil with gas and also the small amounts of other fuels present. For PJM, correlation is slightly underestimated by the simulations except in the case of fixing the gas price path to match history. As expected, this case produces the best overall results among the simulations by eliminating differences caused by the gas price dynamics, and in particular shows a large improvement in the probabilities of hourly prices above $100, $200 or $300. Finally, Tables 6 and 7 underscore the difficulty in comparing statistics 
Simulation Analysis

Forward Price Analysis
In the one-fuel logistic case of the bid stack model, forward electricity prices F P (t, T ) at time t with maturity T can be found in closed form under the following assumptions. We first ignore delivery periods by choosing T to be the midpoint of the delivery period [T 1 , T 2 ]. In the case of monthly forwards with maturity more than a month away, this should have little impact. Secondly, we assume that the market prices of demand risk and margin risk are both zero. In other words, (8) and (9) hold under both the real world measure P and the risk-neutral measure Q. (Note again that by using the Kalman Filter, the dynamics of gas prices G t in (6) are already under Q.) Thirdly, as mentioned before, G t (driven by X 1 t and X 2 t ) is assumed to be independent of bothD t (driven by Y t ) andM t (driven by Z OU t and Z SP t ). Then, from (4), we have
for seasons i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where F G (t, T ) is the forward gas price for the same maturity, and given by (7). We can choose either to calculate F G (t, T ) based on our model or instead use observed Henry Hub gas forwards.
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The top row of Figure 9 compares the model's two-year forward curve with the observed twoyear peak forward curve for NEPOOL for the chosen historical dates. 26 As expected, the use of observed gas forward prices improves the fit of the model, lifting the model's power forward curves slightly. This suggests either higher future risk premiums or higher future expected gas prices, versus the historical period used to calibrate the model. Overall, the results are encouraging, as both the seasonality and upwards or downwards trend in the power forward curve are fairly well captured. Note that the seasonality is a combination of gas price seasonality h(t) (annual with peaks in winter) and demand seasonality f (t) (semi-annual with higher summer peaks), as well as small differences in the margin spike regime. The model performs worst for forwards maturing in January or February, perhaps because the market has priced in the risk of sudden spikes in bids, as was observed in Jan 2004 and 2005, and to a lesser extent in Feb 2007. Upwards trends (eg right graph) and downwards trends (eg left graph) in the power forward curve match with trends in the natural gas forward curve, as they are explained purely by whether G t (and in particular X 1 t ) is higher or lower than the mean reversion level. Finally, the model suggests that a small demand or margin risk premium is present in the New England market, with forward power prices generally slightly above expected spot prices, on average by about $6.20 for the case of matched gas forwards. This is consistent with the fact that the observed mean in Table 6 is only about $68 for 2005-07, while the NEPOOL forward curves in Figure 9 generally lie above this level. The bottom row of Figure 9 shows the forward curves for PJM for the same dates. As no closedform solution for F P (t, T ) is available in the two-fuel case, these results have all been generated by Monte Carlo simulation with 2000 runs. The mean reversion level µ X is allowed to be time dependent to match current gas forwards. The results are perhaps slightly stronger than for NEPOOL, with both the seasonality and trends quite well captured. While the gas forward curve remains the main determinant of the trend in the power forward curve, there is also some contribution from the direction of the coal forward curve. Furthermore, unlike for NEPOOL, the differences in margin spike frequency (particularly in the summer) play quite a significant role in determining the seasonality of power forwards. There are certain months that are less well captured than others, as for example the observed forward price in June is typically closer to May prices than July prices, while October and November tend to equal December. Observed data reveals other patterns which the model cannot capture, such as the fact that neighbouring March and April forwards also tend to have identical prices. However, we can definitely conclude that overall the model performs remarkably well in terms of forward pricing. Finally, though less convincing than for NEPOOL, there is also some evidence of a small demand or margin risk premium in PJM, since observed forward prices are on average $3.60 higher than simulated prices (using matched gas forwards).
Conclusion
The analysis of both the behaviour of simulated trajectories and the model's prices for forward contracts lends strong support to the methodology introduced in Sections 3 and 4, and its ability to capture the dominant features of electricity prices. The bid stack model can now be implemented to price a variety of different options and other derivative contracts. While we leave the details of option pricing to future work, we outline here the benefits of the approach and the variety of extensions possible using the basic underlying framework.
One of the biggest challenges in modelling electricity prices is to capture the variety of different behaviour observed at different timescales, particularly if we are interested in hourly as well as daily prices. It is well acknowledged in the literature (see eg Culot et al (2006) or Kluge (2006) ) that multiple factors are necessary with differing speeds of mean reversion. In our model, this conclusion can be drawn directly from the parameter estimates in Section 4, with X all varying greatly in terms of mean reversion. Long-term behaviour (over monthly and annual horizons) is driven by gas prices (and coal prices to a lesser extent), while medium-term behaviour (over daily and weekly horizons) is largely driven by trends in demand and margin, and finally very short-term behaviour (over hourly horizons) is primarily affected by the spikes in the margin process, which we can think of as sudden outages or transmission constraints. As well as providing welcome intuition for the price dynamics, these results can also simplify the pricing of certain derivative contracts. For example, the value of long-term forwards (or options on long-term forwards) becomes independent of current values of demand and margin. We only require current fuel prices and the invariant distribution ofD andM , (or more specifically ofD/C) to price these claims.
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In addition to describing the variety of different timescales in the market, the bid stack model captures well the striking relationships presented earlier in Figure 1 , as well as Tables 8 and 9 . In particular, by viewing power prices as a function of gas prices (via the bid stack), we capture a more complex dependence structure than would be possible for example using correlated Brownian Motions. While the longer-term trends of correlated processes will tend to diverge eventually, the levels of cointegrated processes will continue to follow each other. The bid stack model explains these characteristics while providing us with a more sophisticated approach than assuming a simple linear relationship between power and gas. For example, in the two-fuel PJM model, the dependence between power and gas becomes stronger during higher demand periods when the coal bids are less relevant, whereas higher demand volatility can weaken it. Even in the one-fuel NEPOOL model, where (4) leads to a linear dependence, the slope of this relationship is constantly changing due to the seasonality of D t /C t . Thus we end up with a relationship which mimics cointegration, but is somewhat more involved.
Another advantage of the bid stack model is that it exploits well-known relationships with underlying observable driving factors in the power markets. This allows us to take advantage of more available data for calibration, as well as to price power and gas derivatives, spark and dark spread options, demand and weather dependent contracts, and even to value power stations in a single unified framework. Finally, this framework is also flexible enough to incorporate local market information which may or may not be available. For example, knowledge about anticipated structural changes (such as an anticipated increase in coal generators versus gas generators) can easily be added to the model in a manner which would be very difficult for a pure spot price model to match. Alternatively, if available, forward looking capacity or margin data could be incorporated through a time-dependent mean reversion level µ Z of the process Z OU t . The use of such data has been shown to be particularly important by Cartea et al (2008) .
The weaknesses of the model include the large number of parameters to be estimated, and the reliance on a large quantity of data. However, the complexity of electricity markets justifies a complicated model and the use of more data avoids a large reliance on historical spot price data. The estimation of risk-neutral dynamics forD t andM t has not been fully discussed here and is an extra complication of the model, though calibration of the market prices of risk to available derivative data is possible. In addition, the model simplifies the often complex structure of electricity markets (including rebalancing effects, agent behaviour, learning and market power) by treating all factors as exogenous, though possibly correlated, whereas in practice a much more involved set of interdependencies may exist. Finally, the simplifying assumptions for the shape of the bid stack may be unrealistic in some markets with many different overlapping fuel types or large amounts of imports from abroad. In this sense the model shares some characteristics with reduced-form models, yet retains strong intuition and clear links to underlying factors. The above issues in power markets imply that there is of course an inevitable compromise between realism and model tractability, and we aim to strike a balance between the two.
We conclude that the bid stack framework serves as an intuitive and realistic approach to modelling electricity prices, tractable enough to obtain some closed-form expressions for forward prices and simple numerical methods for pricing other derivatives. It is also flexible enough to adapt to different markets, and to make use of a variety of data for calibration. We feel that its ability to describe well the many features of the PJM and NEPOOL markets highlights the advantages of a more complicated fundamental model over a pure reduced-form spot price model. In particular, the recent record price levels and high volatility in global oil, natural gas and coal markets further emphasise the need to treat power and other energy price dynamics through a single unified framework. We believe that the bid stack model can be a useful tool in understanding and capturing the important interdependencies that drive energy prices.
